Written by Goh Jia Ni and Magdalene Lee
Summary of RFC Seraing SA v FIFA (Case C-600/23) 1 August 2025
Facts
The dispute arose when Belgian football club RFC Seraing challenged sanctions imposed by FIFA relating to the use of third-party ownership (‘TPO’) arrangements in player transfers. In 2015, FIFA implemented a global ban on TPO agreements, which prohibited clubs and investors from sharing players’ economic rights.
RFC Seraing, which had entered into such arrangements with an investment fund, was sanctioned with fines and a transfer ban by FIFA. The club argued that the ban restricted competition and free movement under European Union (‘EU’) law and sought to challenge the arbitral award confirming FIFA’s sanctions.
Court’s Findings
The Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) delivered a landmark ruling on the nature of sports arbitration. The CJEU recognised that sports arbitration is often ‘forced’, as athletes and clubs must accept arbitration clauses imposed by governing bodies like FIFA if they wish to participate in competitions.
Due to this lack of ‘real’ choice, the court held that final arbitral awards must be subject to effective judicial review, especially where fundamental EU rights are involved. This includes:
- review for compliance with EU public policy;
- enhanced scrutiny where key rights (eg, competition law, free movement) are implicated;
- effective remedies such as damages; and
- availability of interim relief (injunctions).
Position in England
According to lawyer Nick De Marco KC, English law is lagging the European standard when it comes to reviewing sports arbitration decisions. English courts are no longer bound by CJEU decisions or EU law as a result of Brexit. Section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996 allows parties of an arbitration agreement to contractually waive their right to appeal an arbitral award on a point of law.
Decades of case law have strengthened this legal framework. In R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 2 All ER 853, where the Court of Appeal held that the Jockey Club’s powers stemmed from private contractual relationships rather than public law. The effect of this decision is that private sporting bodies are typically exempt from judicial review unlike public organisations, even when their decisions have wide-ranging consequences. In practice, this means that an athlete will have a difficult time arguing in court against the validity of a disciplinary ruling.
More concerningly, sports organisations like the Football Association (‘FA’) and Premier League can and do include clauses in their contracts that prevent players or clubs from appealing a ruling in court. This means that, if a player facing a lifetime ban or a club receiving a points deduction, they cannot challenge the legal correctness of the decision. De Marco argues this is unfair because athletes and clubs are forced to accept these unfair terms if they want to compete. They have no real power to negotiate.
Although English courts have so far sided with the sports bodies, he believes a future lawsuit, likely from an individual player, will eventually force the law to change and grant everyone a right to a proper legal appeal.
Position in Malaysia
Similar to the legal framework in England, Malaysian courts do not reassess the factual findings or merits of a sports arbitration decision. According to s 37 of the Arbitration Act 2005, judicial intervention is permitted only on narrow procedural grounds, such as a breach of fundamental fairness or if the award contradicts Malaysian public policy.
Malaysian case law has adopted a narrow interpretation of these exceptions. A court will not re-evaluate an arbitrator’s findings of fact or their interpretation of the law. The ‘public policy’ exception is used sparingly and is generally reserved for clear cases of fraud or illegality, not an arbitrator’s legal error. For example, in the case of Master Mulia Sdn Bhd v Sigur Rus Sdn Bhd [2020] 12 MLJ 198, the Federal Court affirmed that a breach of natural justice can be a ground for setting aside an award but emphasised that a court will not intervene in an arbitrator’s assessment of evidence. This means that a player banned on shaky legal grounds has little chance of success under this exception, the courts will argue that the arbitral process itself was followed, even if the result was unjust.
Conclusion
The ruling in RFC Seraing SA v FIFA underscores a European trend, that is, courts are increasingly acknowledging that sports arbitration is often mandatory and requires stronger judicial review to safeguard parties’ fundamental rights. This stance contrasts with the approach in England and Malaysia, where courts typically hesitate to intervene in arbitration decisions. This leaves athletes and clubs with few avenues to contest decisions that may be unjust. For Malaysia, this raises the critical future consideration of whether to implement reforms that ensure greater protection for individuals and clubs, particularly when their right to livelihood or natural justice is implicated.
Published on 9 September 2025